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THE RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF
AN OVERRULING CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISION: MAPP v. OHIO
PAuL BENDER t
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Mapp v. Ohio,' suddenly overruling Wolf v. Colorado,' has created an
interesting problem regarding the retroactive effect of an overruling
decision. Wolf, decided in 1949, had held that the Constitution does
not impose upon the states the same obligation imposed upon the national government in Weeks v. United States I to exclude evidence from
criminal trials when it is the fruit of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Mapp holds instead "that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a state court." ' The case was one in which state police officers broke
into defendant's home, used force to restrain her when she objected to
their failure to display a warrant, and conducted an exhaustive search.
Obscene material was found, for the possession of which defendant was
convicted. Overruling Wolf and applying the new exclusionary rule,
the Supreme Court reversed the conviction because it rested upon unconstitutionally seized evidence. Mapp, rather than Wolf, applies for the
future. The problem of retroactivity is to determine which rule applies
when trials predating the announcement of the new exclusionary rule
are now challenged because of the admission of evidence-when trials
which took place under one rule of constitutional law are challenged
under a superseding and contrary rule.
Mapp is explicitly a constitutional case. The ordinary, usually
silent, assumption in the Supreme Court of the United States has undoubtedly been that a decision determining the meaning of the Constitution must be retroactive, even if it is an overruling decision. The
classic statement is in Norton v. Shelby County,5 refuting the argument
that a state statute, held unconstitutional, might nevertheless give
validity to official conduct taken pursuant to it before the announcement
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of unconstitutionality: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed." 6 Under this view, a judicial decision, overruled because
unconstitutional, probably should be no more operative than an unconstitutional statute.
But prospective judicial overruling has become an accepted technique in some states,7 and, perhaps under this influence, the Supreme
Court has more recently declared that there are appropriate limits to
treating unconstitutional federal law "as though it had never been
passed." According to a unanimous opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes in Chicot County DrainageDist. v. Baxter State Bank: s
that such broad statements as to
[I]t is quite clear . ..
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects,-with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, or prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most
oIbid. Even under this traditional view of absolute retroactivity of coistitutional
decisions, an exception might be made by the Court for state judicial overrulings
which, if retroactively applied, would unconstitutionally impair the obligation of
contracts. See Muhlker v. New York & H.R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905); Douglass v.

County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879); Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt,

57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 432 (1853). See also Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 175, 206 (1863). The Court would no longer so use the contract clause.
Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159
U.S. 103 (1895). For the effect of an overruling decision in general, see FIELD, THE
EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE

(1935); Snyder, Retrospective Operation

of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILI- L. REv. 121 (1940); Spruill, The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L. REv. 199 (1940); Stimson, Retroactive Application of
Law-A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1939); Note, 60

HARv. L. Rzv. 437 (1947) ; Address of Chief Judge Cardoso, 55 Report of N.Y.S.B.A.,
263, 294-95 (1932).
As to an overruling decision in the traditional view, see 1 BLACKSTONE, ComMmNTARmS *70: "[T]he subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but
to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former
decision is manifestly absurd or injust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was
bad law, but that it was not law ...

.

7 See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 296
Ky. 815, 177 S.W2d 588 (1943) ; State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 630-31, 107 P.2d 324,
329 (1940). State prospective overruling was found consistent with the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co.,
287 U.S. 358 (1932).
8308 U.S. 371 (1940).
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difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.'
With regard to the particular past circumstances in which a constitutional overruling decision will not be given full retroactive application, the Court has never been more expositive, and there are almost
no decisions. In the Chicot County case a federal district court had
entered a decree under the statute before it was ruled unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held the subject matter of the district court decree
to be res judicata. Reliance by the parties upon overruled federal law
probably would also give reason for denying retroactive application to an
overruling decision in some circumstances. Should the Court, for example, ever overrule its decisions in Harris v. United States 10 and
United States v. Rabinowits," permitting broad searches incident to
lawful arrests, and hold instead that the Constitution prohibits such
searches without warrants, it would not be frivolous to urge that a
policeman who had made a broad incidental search without a warrant
before the overruling decision should not be liable for damages in tresA not entirely dispass or for violation of the Civil Rights Acts.'
similar case is James v. United States,'3 decided one month before
Mapp v. Ohio. James was a tax-evasion prosecution for failure to report embezzlements as income. The Court had previously held that
embezzlements were not income under the same provision of the Internal Revenue Code. 4 In James the Court overruled that decision
but dismissed James' indictment. There was no opinion joined in by
a majority of the Justices, and the decision may have turned entirely
on the statutory need for the evasion to be "willful." The result of the
case is, however, that, so far as prosecutions for evasion are concerned,
the overruling decision is prospective only.15
9 Id. at 374.

10 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
11339 U.S. 56 (1950).

Compare Abel v. United
12 REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960):
Of these cases, Harris and Rabinowitz set by far the most permissive limits
on searches incidental to lawful arrests. In view of their judicial context,
the trial judge and the Government justifiably relied upon these cases for
guidance at the trial; and the petitioner himself accepted the Harris case on
the motion to suppress, nor does he ask this Court to reconsider Harris and
Rabinowitz. It would, under these circumstances, be unjustifiable retrospective lawmaking for the Court in this case to reject the authority of these
decisions.

Is 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
'4

Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).

15 Attention in the Supreme Court to the possibility of prospectively changing

federal law seems to have been increasing. In addition to the James case, at least
two Justices have separately urged, although without success, that particular decisions
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Thus, despite general statements, there seem to be potential limits
upon the retroactive application of overruling constitutional decisions.
The problem is to determine for each case whether there are reasons for
imposing a limit. Chicot County suggests that reliance and res judicata
are not the only reasons which may be deemed compelling in limiting
retroactivity. 6 The Supreme Court, through a failure even to recognize the question in all but one or two cases where it has come up, has
given no general guidelines. The purpose of this article is to examine
what seems relevant in determining the proper retroactive effect of a
particular overruling constitutional decision in a case where the Court
has not adequately treated the question-Mapp v. Ohio. I shall urge
that the retroactive effect of Mapp ought, in fact, to be quite limited,
not so much because of reliance upon the old law as because the purposes of the new law do not seem to be meaningfully served by applying
it to the past.
I. THE GENERAL

CHARACTER OF THE PROBLEM

The quick argument for retroactive'" application of Mapp is
probably as follows: It is now held that a conviction obtained through
announcing new principles-one of them constitutional, the other not-be applied
only prospectively. See Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S.
267, 276 (1951) (newly articulated duties of a reorganization trustee); Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25 (1956) (newly articulated
obligation of state to provide indigent defendant with free transcript on appeal).
In the same term as Mapp, in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961), the
plurality opinion of four Justices laid down a rule of conduct to be followed in the
future by federal trial judges but did not overturn a conviction in a previous trial
where the rule possibly had not been followed. See also note 12 supra.
There is one outstanding case of prospective overruling of federal law in a lower
federal court. In 1941 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided
that a decision of the Supreme Court overruling an earlier decision of the Court giving
broad scope to statutory summary contempt would not be applied for the benefit of
a prisoner convicted under the overruled decision and now seeking to attack his conviction collaterally: 'We reject the idea that if a court was considered to have the
power . . . to do a certain thing under existing statutory construction, and . . .
that construction is changed so that it no longer has the power to do that thing, it
should be concluded that it never had the power . . . ." Warring v. Colpoys, 122
F.2d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941). The opinion is severely
in 2 HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PRoCESs 631-36 (Tent. ed. 1958).
criticized
16
See text accompanying note 9 supra.
17 Throughout this article, "retroactive" is used to indicate application of the new
exclusionary rule to trials taking place before Mapp's announcement; application of
the rule to trials taking place after the Mapp decision is considered "prospective.' But
application of Mapp to a trial held shortly after Mapp's decision might well affect
occurrences before the decision and thus might be looked on as a "retroactive" application. The criminal conduct, the unconstitutional police conduct, and some of the
trial preparation in a case tried shortly after Mapp's decision will have predated
Mapp. A retroactive application of new law is probably bothersome only when some
action was taken in reliance upon the old law. It is safe to say that no criminal
conduct prosecuted after Mapp was engaged in in reliance upon Wolf. Although it
is not beyond belief that state police may have engaged in unconstitutional searches
whose fruits would be used in cases tried just after Mapp because of Wolf, that reliance is entitled to no weight, particularly in view of the language of the Wolf
opinion. Some trial preparation, however, may legitimately have been done in reliance
upon Wolf before the MaNp decision, and it is remotely possible that evidence has
thus been irretrievably lost which would not have been lost had Mapp been the law
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the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence is unconstitutional. If
there is a postconviction remedy for such a constitutional error, one
should not refuse it to persons already convicted by means of such evidence simply because they were convicted too early. Refusing retroactive enforcement will keep them in prison on the basis of what is now
deemed to be an unconstitutional trial. Without going deeply into the
purpose of the new rule, the contrary argument is probably one of reliance: for twelve years state courts in at least half the states have used
relevant evidence in reliance upon express permission given by the
Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorada.'8 Wolf had never, until the day
of its overruling, been said to be of doubtful authority by a majority of
the Court. 9 If the Constitution is now held to have been violated by
a conviction rendered before Mapp's decision, there must be a new trial
of a defendant already proven guilty. One should not so overturn the
widespread and seemingly legitimate use by state courts and prosecutors
of probative evidence to determine guilt in reliance upon Wolf, especially since successful reprosecutions may now often be impossible.20
The clash of interests can be resolved, I believe, by recognizing
the specially prospective reasons for Mapp's exclusionary rule which
make it unnecessary to disturb legitimate reliance upon Wolf in order
to vindicate Mapp's constitutional purpose; but that does not solve the
whole problem. To say that Mapp is "prospective" does not immediately determine which prisoners are to have its benefit and which are
not. The Supreme Court's decision was announced on June 19, 1961.
It was applied to reverse Miss Mapp's conviction. If "prospective"
all along. The same kind of retroactivity was potentially present in the Mapp case
itself, but the Court applied the new rule there without seeming to consider it. Later
in this article, I advance the suggestion that cases relevantly later in time than Mapp
are entitled to the benefit of the new rule even though some retroactive application
of the law may be present. See notes 87-92 infra and accompanying text.
18Although Mapp is an overruling decision, it is not wholly fair to say that it
represents a complete reversal of prior law. Even under Wolf, states were not
free to permit the use of relevant nontestimonial evidence in complete disregard of
the manner in which it had been obtained. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
held that evidence obtained from the defendant through forcible use of a stomach
pump could not be used: "Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle,
precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of [state] conduct more
precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that
offend 'a sense of justice."
Id. at 173. How much change Mapp. actually brings
about depends upon what searches by state officials will be held to violate "the Constitution," a question so far not explicitly resolved by the Court. Although the
constitutional standards governing state officials under the fourteenth amendment
may not be the same as those governing federal officials under the fourth, it is fair
to predict, in view of the whole Court's treatment of Mapp as an overruling decision
of great importance, that Mapp will be far more restrictive upon state law enforcement
officials than Rochin.
19 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213-14 (1960).
20 State reliance upon the admissibility of unconstitutionally seized evidence in
trials conducted before Wolf was decided may not be entitled to as much consideration as reliance after Wolf. had expressly held such evidence admissible. I do not,
however, suppose Mapp can be made to apply to persons convicted before Wolf or
after Mapp but not to those convicted in between.

19621

MAPP v. OHIO

means "after the date of decision," someone tried on June 18 would
not benefit from the new rule, although Miss Mapp did, and she was
tried months before that. Yet it is not easy to pick a date prior to the
Mapp decision-for example, the date of Miss Mapp's trial-and say
that on that day, otherwise without significance, the meaning of the
Constitution suddenly changed and that all prisoners subsequently convicted are entitled to Mapp's benefit, whereas those previously convicted
are not.
Practically, Mapp's potential retroactive effect seems quite significant. Despite the national government's lead, almost half the states
were admitting unconstitutionally seized evidence in their criminal
trials when Mapp v. Ohio was decided.2 In 1949, when Wolf v. Colorado was decided, the fraction was about two-thirds. 22 Among the
"admission" states have been some of the most populous: New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and, until 1955, California. Thus, if Mapp is
held to be retroactive, there are likely to be a large number of state
prisoners ready to invoke postconviction remedies to claim that their
convictions are unconstitutional. If Mapp should be applied broadly
to previous trials through these remedies, it is difficult to say why
almost every state prisoner in an "admission" state who has been
convicted through officially obtained nontestimonial proof cannot in
good faith demand at least a hearing to determine how that proof was
obtained-to determine, for example, whether there was sufficient cause
to make a search or an arrest preceding a search. This is an issue
heretofore largely irrelevant and probably unsettled by the trial record,
but upon which a constitutional right would now turn. If Mapp is
unconditionally retroactive, not only must there be a large number of
hearings, but a large number of prisoners from "admission" states are
probably entitled ultimately to have their convictions reversed, for a
primary reason given for overruling Wolf was that under its rule state
police did not sufficiently respect constitutional limits. Even in states
which have been applying an exclusionary rule, the constitutional restraints upon police may not have been properly interpreted.
II. AVAILABILITY OF A POSTCONVICTION REMEDY
The national significance of Mapp's potential retroactive effect

depends largely upon the availability of federal habeas corpus to invoke
the new decision. There are not likely to be a very large number of
2

1 See Appendix to Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960).
See Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39 (1949).
23Two cases from such a state which the Court has agreed to review are People
v. Ker, 15 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 974 (1962) ;
22

Robinson v. California, 184 Cal. App. 2d 69, 7 Cal. Rptr. 202 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960),

prob. juris. noted, 368 U.S. 918 (1961).
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pre-Mapp convictions still directly reviewable in the Supreme Court,24
and if Mapp cannot be raised through federal collateral attack, states
with collateral remedies of a similar or narrower scope may also justifiably refuse relief. Thus the question whether Mapp is retroactive will
be largely academic if federal habeas corpus can in no circumstances be
invoked to claim the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence.
Although it is not entirely clear whether federal habeas corpus
will be available to invoke the new exclusionary rule, it seems that it
will. In administering the Weeks rule, the Supreme Court appears
never to have determined that the admission of evidence in a federal
prosecution can be collaterally attacked. There have been a number of
cases in the lower federal courts under Weeks which have held that the
question of illegally seized evidence could not be raised on collateral attack, with dicta that this is generally the rule.25 However, if federal
habeas corpus is now generally available to challenge an unconstitutional trial, as seems to be the case,"8 Mapp would be appropriately
raised through the writ," for the Court has explicitly held that the
admission of evidence in violation of Mapp is unconstitutional. It is
true that Mapp's constitutional error does not go to abstract "guilt,"
but neither does the admission of a compelled but reliable confession,
which can be raised on federal habeas corpus.28 The lower court decisions under Weeks are not inconsistent with the conclusion that Mapp
may be raised collaterally, for in all of them, either (1) the seized material was not actually used in evidence but allegedly induced a guilty
.24 Some of those so far reported are described in the Note at the end of this
article.
See pp. 680-83 infra.
2
5 E.g., Jones v. Attorney General, 278 F.2d 699, 701 (8th Cir. 1960): "The
legality of a search and seizure and the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby
are questions for the trial proceedings and for an appeal from conviction, and are
not matters which can be used to make a collateral attack upon the conviction and
sentence." Among the other cases are United States v. Zavada, 291 F.2d 189 (6th
Cir. 1961); Plummer v. United States, 260 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam);"
Wilkins v. United States, 258 F2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United States v. Scales,
249 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 945 (1958); United States v.
Walker, 197 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 877 (1952); Graham
v. Squier, 132 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777 (1943); Taylor v.
Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1940). According to a well-respected state judge,
not at all hostile to the exclusionary rule, this line of cases establishes that "the lower
federal courts have consistently adhered to the rule that the question of unconstitutionally seized evidence may not be raised on collateral attack." Traynor, J., concurring in In re Harris, 366 P.2d 305, 308 (Cal. 1961). Justice Traynor takes the
position that the exclusionary rule should not be invokable on collateral attack. See
note 246 infra.
6 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) ; see Hill v. United States,
368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (dictum).
27The Court's opinion in Mapp seems silently to have assumed the new rule to
be potentially available on collateral attack: "As is always the case, however, state
procedural requirements governing assertion and pursuance of direct and collateral
constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions must be respected." 367 U.S. at
659 n.9. See also Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE
L.3. 218, 236 =.105 (1961), indicating his and Judge Learned Hand's similar assumption.
28 See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
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plea; (2) at the time of decision the collateral remedy was believed to
apply only to jurisdictional defects; (3) the federal exclusionary rule
was not deemed to be a constitutionally required rule and thus not raisable on collateral attack-a belief frequently founded on Wolf but
squarely rejected in Mapp; or (4) the question of admissibility had
been waived through not being raised at trial or not being invoked on
appeal.
Although postconviction collateral attack may theoretically be
generally available, it may be urged that a doctrine of waiver will actually eliminate most retroactive claims. Ordinarily, the state may
urge that a constitutional matter is closed to a state prisoner if it was
not duly raised when the opportunity was fairly present to do so. 29
Can it be said that, even though Mapp may be retroactive in theory,
the only state prisoners who can now claim Mapp's benefit over the
state's objection are those who are able to show that they moved to
suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence at their trials, and that they
pressed the question on appeal as fully as possible? If so, this would
greatly reduce the practical problem, for in the light of Wolf it is unlikely that there are very many such prisoners.
If there is a constitutional right to Mapp's benefit capable of being
applied to persons previously convicted, the brunt of Mapp's retroactivity does not seem to me to be fairly avoidable through invoking
supposed waivers on the part of prisoners who did not object to evidence at trial or on appeal. The application of constitutional law
cannot under any meaningful doctrine of waiver be conditioned upon
the defendant having raised arguments which, at the time they should
have been raised, had been fully and expressly rejected by the Supreme
Court. There does not seem to be any reason to penalize prisoners
who accepted Wolf as compared with those who either did not know
of it, ignored it, or attempted, despite its apparent continued validity,
to have it overruled. Presumably the Court does not aim to encourage
constitutional litigation over what it has held to be settled, and the result of such a distinction would be to discourage defendants from abandoning any argument, no matter how often it has been rejected by the
Court. A broad distinction among prisoners who now claim a constitutional right on the basis of whether they did or did not acquiesce in
Wolf before Mapp seems untenable.3 0
29
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 482-87 (1953); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d
727, 733-35 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 934 (1961).
30 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25

(1956), which announced for the first time a new principle governing state criminal
procedure:
Candor compels the acknowledgement that the decision rendered today is a
new ruling. Candor compels the further acknowledgement that it would not

be unreasonable for all indigent defendants, now incarcerated, who at the
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The significance of an objection to evidence made when there was
no exclusionary rule is illustrated in a state context by cases coming
after People v. Cahan,3 ' in which the Supreme Court of California
overruled its previous decisions refusing to exclude illegally seized evidence and adopted the Weeks rule instead. There were quickly presented for decision a number of pending appeals in which illegally
seized evidence had been used at trial before the announcement of the
overruling decision. The California Supreme Court seems to have
assumed Cahan to be potentially applicable to all these appeals. In
People v. Kitchens, 2 for much the reasons just given, a distinction
between prisoners who had and had not objected to the introduction of
the evidence was correctly rejected. The case was reversed and
remanded for a hearing at which both parties would "be given an opportunity to litigate the issue of the legality of the search and seizure
on the basis of all of the facts." ' But in People v. Fararra,4 decided
the same day, a different limitation was created: only when the record
on appeal established "prima facie" that the search and seizure were
illegal would Cahan be held applicable to pending appeals in previous
trials and a hearing ordered to determine illegality. 5 This result followed because "to reverse the judgment it would be necessary to presume that the officers acted illegally . . ."
But "error will not be
presumed on appeal . . . and in the absence of evidence to the contime were unable to pay for transcripts of the proceedings in trial courts, to
urge that they were justified in assuming that such a restriction upon criminal
appeals in Illinois was presumably a valid exercise of the State's power
at the time when they suffered its consequences. Therefore it could well be
claimed that thereby any conscious waiver of a constitutional right is
negatived.
See also Litchfield v. Tinsley, 281 F.2d 486, 487-88 (10th Cir. 1960); Medberry v.
Patterson, 174 F. Supp. 720, 725-26 (D. Colo. 1959),; United States ex rel. Reck v.
Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734, 746-47 (N.D. Ill.
1959), affd, 274 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1960),
vacated mb noin. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Allen, Federalism and the
Fourth Amendment, in THE SUPREME COURT RvIEw 1, 42-46 (Kurland ed. 1961).
This last case seems to be a very dubious application of Mr. justice Frankfurter's
argument. A few decisions in the district courts on federal habeas corpus brought
after Mapp seem to have used waiver as a 'reason for denying the petition in a way
which seems to me illegitimate. See cases discussed in the Note appended to this
article, pp. 680-83 infra.
A different question arises if the Supreme Court holds Mapp not generally
retroactive and a state nonetheless chooses to apply the decision to previous trials,
but only in cases of prisoners who moved to suppress the evidence at trial. It would
there have to be decided whether that state differentiation was so arbitrary as to
contravene the fourteenth amendment
3144 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
32 46 Cal. 2d 260, 294 P2d 17 (1956).
33 Id. at 264, 294 P2d at 20.
34 46 Cal. 2d 265, 294 P.2d 21 (1956).

35 See also People v. Citrino, 46 Cal. 2d 284, 287, 294 P.2d 32, 34 (1956);
People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 304, 294 P.2d 6, 8, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858

(1956).
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trary it must also be presumed that the officers regularly and lawfully
performed their duties." 36
The limit on retroactive use of postconviction remedies in Fararra
is not so drastic as the doctrine of waiver and may be justifiable as a
reasonable limitation on the availability of state remedies, but it
should not be used to limit federal habeas corpus. 7 If persons convicted before Mapp cannot be charged with any obligation to have
objected to the evidence used against them it will be primarily a matter
of luck whether the state record reveals police misdeeds. If there is
a constitutional right to Mapp's benefit available to previously convicted state prisoners, at least the federal courts should now have to
permit a record of alleged police illegality to be made out, in view of the
fact that the previous state record was made when the vital facts were
justifiably believed by both sides to be irrelevant." If not, there would
be a "constitutional right" without any fair chance to assert it. There
would be irony too in defeating the constitutional claim through presuming that the state police acted legitimately when a basis-perhaps
the most important basis-of both Cahan and Mapp was a judgment
that the exclusionary rule is necessary to stop the police from making
the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of privacy "an empty promise," 11
"'because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance
"40
"
with the constitutional provisions ....
convicted while Wolf
prisoners
retroactive,
to
be
is
held
If Mapp
v. Colorado was law should not have their remedies limited either by
their failure to object to evidence or by the failure of the record to show
police unconstitutionality. If it is burdensome and disturbing to look
forward to a vast number of hearings at the request of previously convicted state prisoners claiming the benefit of Mapp, that must be taken
into account in deciding whether it is indeed wise or necessary to say
that Mapp is generally retroactive. Such considerations should not be
permitted to generate illegitimate distinctions between individual pris3

6 People v. Fararra, 46 Cal. 2d 265, 268, 294 P.2d 21, 23 (1956).

37The only use of the Fararradoctrine in California has been on direct review.

I have not been able to find reports of any California collateral attacks under
Cahan, and a recent opinion in the California Supreme Court by the author of Cahan,
Kitchens, and Fararrareviewing the problem does not mention any, suggesting, on the
contrary, that state collateral attack should not be available to raise the admission of
unconstitutionally seized evidence. Traynor, J., concurring in In, re Harris, 366 P.2d
305, 309, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 894 (1961). See note 46 infra.
3
It is interesting that in the few cases in the states which have so far considered
the application of Mapp to trials where the record was made before Maffs announcement, the principal problem has seemed to be to afford the prosecution an opportunity
now to justify what the record shows to have been an unreasonable search. See
cases discussed in the Note appended to this article, pp. 680-83 infra.
3
9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
40 Id. at 651, quoting People v. Callan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911

(1955).
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oners. I should like, then, to give my reasons for believing that Mapp's
application ought generally to be only prospective.
III.

THE PROSPECTIVE PURPOSE OF

Mapp

It is difficult to assign a particular reason to a decision which
comes after long constitutional controversy; nor is the Mapp opinion
unambiguous with respect to the reasons for decision. But the reason
which seems principally to have motivated the Court to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence from state criminal trials does not appear to apply in general to past trials. If the primary constitutional
purpose compelling state exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence
will not be served by a sweeping reexamination of past convictions,
then, especially in view of action taken by the states in legitimate reliance upon Wolf-some of it irrevocable-there is no reason not to
say that Mapp, generally, should be applied only prospectively. That
the reasons for an overruling constitutional decision are adequately
served when its application is limited to the future seems as good a
reason for limiting retroactive application when the overruled decision
has been a guide to conduct as those grounds generally touched on in
the opinion in the Chicot County case. 41
A. Deterring Unconstitutional Searches
What is the constitutional reason for Mapp? Although the rule
is one excluding evidence, it is plain that it derives not at all from the
probative character of unconstitutionally seized material. Narcotics
seized without a warrant are as cogent in evidence as narcotics seized
through solicitous police procedures. Persons convicted through unconstitutionally seized nontestimonial evidence plainly are not deprived
of a fair trial in the sense of a trial ill-suited to the discovery of truth.
The compulsory exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence
in the states seems designed primarily not to insure a fair trial on the
issue of guilt but to protect the interest of the individual outside the
courtroom in being free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
his privacy, a freedom recognized specifically in the fourth amendment
as respects the federal government and held by the Court to be implicit
to some extent in the fourteenth amendment as respects state officials.
It is an accepted belief today that this freedom is protected through
the exclusion of evidence because of the deterrent effect exclusion will
have upon the police who gather evidence. Exclusion is primarily
designed to eliminate an encouragement which would otherwise exist
41 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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for police to ignore constitutional limits upon their conduct, thus protecting everyone, guilty and innocent, from improper searches by tending to make them fruitless no matter what is discovered.2 Exclusion
of relevant evidence is resorted to because there is no other effective
Although it is not an entirely satisfactory means
means of discipline."
there can be no doubt that the Court in
Constitution,
the
of enforcing
Mapp v. Ohio, believing that the police in states which were admitting
unconstitutionally seized evidence had too frequently ignored and would
continue to ignore the Constitution, found exclusion necessary primarily for these reasons of deterrence:
In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf
[to be free from unconstitutional state searches and seizures]
could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but
in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last
year the Court [in Elkins v. United States 44] itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is "to deterto compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effective available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." 45
This purpose of the new rule to deter police, which seems from
the Mapp opinion to be its main purpose, is not meaningfully served
by the general application of the rule to past trials. The purpose of
deterrence is a particularly prospective purpose. The only police conduct which can now be deterred is future conduct. It is unlikely that
sudden reexamination of a great number of old trials would increase
the future obedience of state police to constitutional rules. If police respect for the Constitution in states previously admitting unconstitutionally seized evidence is to be changed by Mapp v. Ohio it is because
they will now act with the expectation that the fruits of unconstitutional
searches, and therefore unconstitutional searches themselves, will no
See United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926) (L. Hand, J.)
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961) :
Significantly, among these now following the rule is California, which
according to its highest court, was "compelled to reach that conclusion
because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with
." People v. Calton, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445,
the constitutional provisions. ...
282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955). In connection with this California case, we note
that the second basis elaborated in Wolf in support of its failure to enforce
the exclusionary doctrine against the States was that "other means of protection! have been afforded "the right to privacy." 338 U.S. at 30. The
experience of California that such other remedies have been worthless and
futile is buttressed by the experience of other States.
44 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
45
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
42

43
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longer be useful. That expectation depends entirely upon the Court's
explicit determination to enforce the Mapp rule in the future, not on
the reversal of convictions going back into the past.
I do not mean to say, of course, that the exclusionary rule, though
announced, should never be applied to reverse a conviction, on the
ground that it is always only the threat of future exclusion which controls the police. If that course were followed for long there would
obviously be no effective threat. The rule must be enforced. It has
been enforced in the Mapp case and will continue to be enforced in
future trials in which there is no reason for adhering to the old law.
But it does not seem to further deterrence to upset what is past and
what was done in reliance upon Wolf. The fact of reliance, coupled
with the fact that retroactivity will not further the purpose of the new
rule, counsels leaving past convictions as they are. 46
B. Other Possible Purposes
Although deterrence is the main reason for the new rule, are there
perhaps other reasons for Mapp which would make it more properly
retroactive in application? The Court's opinion expresses considerable
concern for " 'the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal courts' " having different rules regarding the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence and for the elimination of suspicious
"working arrangements" between federal and state officials and the
"inducement to evasion" of the federal exclusionary rule which occurred as long as evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal officials
might be used by state officials in state courts having concurrent jurisdiction. "Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their
46 The only reason concerned with police deterrence which I can imagine for
generally reexamining past convictions is that by immediately providing a great
number of cases for litigation full retrospective application of Mapp would inevitably
result in clarifying more quickly the boundaries of the new rule, particularly the
meaning of "unconstitutional searches and seizures" as applied to state police conduct,
and would thereby provide a surer guide for future police activity. It would be
fantastic for a court thus deliberately to create litigation for the purpose of clarifying
its decision; it is also quite possible that deterrence is more effective under a broadly
phrased rule of unsure content than under decisions whose limits are clear.
Justice Traynor has used Mapp's prospective purpose of police deterrence as a
basis for suggesting not that the rule ought to be prospective only, but that it should
not be available on collateral attack, apparently even for a post-Mapp trial. In re
Harris, 366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961) (concurring opinion). The argument
seems to be that since no single decision refusing to exclude evidence significantly
impairs the deterrent effect if the exclusionary rule is generally applied, there is no
need based on deterrence to enforce the rule on collateral attack as long as it is enforced
at trial and on direct review. Since the number of pre-Mapp convictions pending
on direct review is limited, Justice Traynor's approach would result in Mapp generally being prospective in application. I agree with this result, but I cannot see
the justification for denying the benefit of the exclusionary rule to persons unconstitutionally convicted after Mapp because it is sought on collateral attack.
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now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their
approaches." "' Although these are not inconsequential benefits of the
new rule, their status as constitutional reasons is questionable, and it is
doubtful therefore that they could have determined the Mapp decision.
At any rate, insofar as Mapp can eliminate differences between federal
and state law, this is accomplished as well by prospective operation of
the new rule and will not be furthered by the reversal of past convictions in cases where both state police and state courts have already
acted under the old rule.
The Court's opinion in Mapp suggests "'the imperative of judicial
integrity' " as a possible justification for the new rule separate from
the purpose to deter state police from constitutional infractions. "The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
it own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." 48 The Court cites Elkins v. United States,4 9 which had prohibited federal courts from using evidence unconstitutionally seized by
state officials, and Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead
v. United States,5" urging the federal courts to reject evidence obtained
through wiretapping. Judicial integrity was obviously relevant in
Elkins and Olmstead since those cases dealt with evidential rules to be
followed by the federal courts-rules which did not need to be, and
indeed in Elkins were expressly said not to be, constitutional rules.
Mapp, however, creating a rule governing state courts, had to be a
constitutional decision. It is difficult to say that the due process clause,
concerned with fairness to the accused individual, imposes such notions
of judicial integrity on state courts, forbidding them to use relevant
evidence to achieve convictions when that would not be consistent
with the state court's integrity. Nor would that integrity-if it is a
separate federal concern under the fourteenth amendment-be significantly advanced by reversing now a number of cases in which the
evidence was received and the conviction rendered before Mapp was
announced.
If Mapp v. Ohio must be applied generally to previous trials, it
must be because its rule is intended directly to relieve those who have
actually suffered an unconstitutional search, not just to provide an indirect means of assuring general privacy through the removal of an
incentive to police to act improperly. It seems safe to say that the
exclusion of evidence is not a constitutionally required state compen4

7Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961).

481d. at 659.

49364 U.S. 206 (1960).
50 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
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sation for the victims of an unconstitutional search. If the purpose is
to relieve the individual defendant it must be because of some unconstitutional unfairness at his trial through the use of the evidence. There
is one Supreme Court decision, made while Wolf v. Colorado was the
law, which did indeed seem to call for the exclusion of evidence improperly seized by state police without explicit reference to a purpose
to deter state police but because the use of the evidence, though probative, was thought to deprive the accused of a trial compatible with due
process of law. Rochin v. California5' compelled the exclusion of evidence by the State because of the particularly brutal way in which it
had been obtained by the police from the person of the accused: "convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of
justice.'" Although the search in Mapp involved some use of illegitimate physical force against Miss Mapp in the course of securing the
evidence, the Court plainly did not decide Mapp as a particular application of Rochin.52 Nor does it seem that the opinion in Mapp can be
taken to have created a sudden and sweeping extension of the Rochin
decision, holding that there is a violation of the due process clause because of offensiveness to "a sense of justice" whenever unconstitutionally obtained evidence is used against an accused, despite the absence of a violation of the person, which was the basis of Rochin.58
It is highly relevant in this regard that Justices Douglas and Black,
whose votes were necessary to constitute the five-Justice majority in
Mapp, wrote concurring opinions. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion states
only the need for deterrence of state police as a reason for the new
decision; Mr. Justice Black's opinion particularly stresses his belief that
the Court was not relying on the necessarily imprecise rule of Rochin
to decide Mapp. It should certainly have taken some exposition, not
present in the Mapp opinion, to show why, apart from the need to
deter state police, state courts act inconsistently with fundamental ideas
of fairness to the individual when they convict through perfectly relevant evidence not taken in any way from the person, leaving the remedy
for the police misconduct to a separate proceeding.
C. The Theory of Self-Incrimination
There is one situation in which the exclusion of evidence has
always been deemed to be constitutionally required without explora51342 U.S. 165 (1952).
52
Rochin, in fact, has never subsequently been applied by the Court to reverse
a conviction, although it has been urged. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957) ; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). I can find only one such application in the lower courts. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957).
53
Rochin is cited but once in the Court's opinion, and that is a "cf." reference
to a single page. 367 U.S. at 657, quoted note 60 infra.
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tion of the need for police deterrence: when its use would amount to
unconstitutional self-incrimination. Although the Court has held that
the federal rule against compelled self-incrimination is not as such
applicable to the states,54 a basic part of it is probably enforceable
through the due process clause. If self-incrimination was a basis for
Mapp, there would be reason for its application to previous convictions,
for these individual trials would now be deemed to have been constitutionally unfair apart from the prospective general purpose of police
deterrence.
One possible reason for overturning some convictions based on
compelled incrimination-that compulsion makes the evidence so
unreliable that its use is not due process-plainly does not apply
in Mapp and other cases where materials whose very possession is
illegal, like narcotics or obscenity, have been seized. But a coerced
confession will be excluded under the due process clause despite any
substantial doubt as to its truth. 55 The cases so holding have at
least a surface similarity to Mapp, for reliable evidence obtained unconstitutionally cannot be used. And the use of a quotation from Boyd
v. United States "6 in the beginning of the Mapp opinion 57 suggests
that an aspect of self-incrimination may be a basis for the new exclusionary rule: "Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers
are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used
as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the
condemnation [of the fourth and fifth Amendments] .... ,"5'

Although the Court's opinion in Mapp never clearly states selfincrimination as a basis for decision, Mr. Justice Black's concurring
opinion, relying upon Boyd, asserts that the self-incrimination inherent in the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence is not only a possible
ground, but to his mind the only tenable ground for the Court's
judgment.59 Mr. Justice Black's vote was needed to make the opinion
in Mapp an opinion of the Court. Since the Court's opinion is not
wholly clear as to the reasons for decision, his theory must be reckoned with. 0 But I think it can be shown that the Boyd case is not,
54 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
55 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), and cases cited therein.

116 U.S. 616 (1886).

57 367 U.S. at 647.

58 Id.at 630.
59
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-66 (1961).

60 The closest the Court's opinion comes to relying upon a theory of self-incrimination is the following difficult passage:
[A]s to the Federal Government the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and,
as to the States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and

the freedom from convictions based upon coerced confessions do enjoy an
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in fact, authority for the exclusionary rule of Mapp and that the use
of the seized matter to convict in the latter case was not meaningfully
self-incrimination. There is therefore no reason to suppose that a majority of the Court implicitly adopted Mr. Justice Black's theory of
decision that a trial based upon unconstitutionally seized evidence is
unfair aside from the need for deterrence of police.
If the Mapp decision had been based upon self-incrimination, it
should be irrelevant that the police had failed to secure a judicial warrant before seizing the evidence. Judicial authority for the production of
evidence does not eliminate self-incrimination, it aggravates it. Police
cannot get a warrant to compel a man to incriminate himself, no matter
how strong the probable cause to believe in his guilt."' When the use
of evidence amounts to compelled self-incrimination, production of that
evidence for use in a prosecution could not be officially compelled. Obscene materials are, however, the proper object of governmental
process; their production can be compelled if the compulsion takes a
proper form. The police infraction in Mapp was that the search was
made without a warrant and without good reason to search without a
warrant. With a proper warrant the evidence could have properly
been compelled by the police, and if it had been, its use plainly would
not have been deemed unconstitutional by the Court. Thus Mapp cannot have involved what is ordinarily meant by self-incrimination.
In the Boyd case, the Court expressly held the evidence sought by
the Government was evidence which the Government was not entitled to
compel under any circumstances. Boyd held unconstitutional a federal
statute permitting the subpoena of a person's books for use at a pro"intimate relation" in their perpetuation of "principles of humanity and civil
liberty [secured] . . . only after years of struggle," Bramn v. United States,
168 U.S. 532, 543-544 (1897). They express "supplementing phases of the
same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate large areas of personal
privacy." Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-490 (1944). The
philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary to,
although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influencethe very least that together they assure in either sphere is that no man is
to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
367 U.S. at 657. At best, this does not refute the theory. To say that the fourth
and fifth amendments are part of a great constitutional purpose to protect liberty
is to state the truth, but it is certainly not to say that the fifth amendment is responsible for the Mapp decision. The end of the passage seems at first to be giving
a reason for decision, but it does not. The question in Mapp was whether the use
of evidence is unconstitutional because it has been unconstitutionally obtained. It
states the result, but not the reason, to refer to the evidence in Mapp as "unconstitutional evidence!' The only possible reason for decision given here is symmetry
between the fourth and fifth amendments: if violations of one lead to exclusion so
should violations of the other. I assume that a desire for symmetry is not a sufficient
reason to limit state power under the fourteenth amendment.
61 In this sense, Rochin may be similar to the confession cases. Would the Court
have upheld the conviction in that case if the extraction of the evidence from the
defendant through forcible use of a stomach pump had been authorized by a court
upon probable cause?
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ceeding to forfeit his goods. The compulsive procedure there-a
subpoena-was regular and as solicitous of privacy as a proper warrant. The point of the case was that a search solely for evidence is unconstitutional; the only proper searches are for materials which the
Government has some right to possess or confiscate aside from their
value as evidence, although, once seized, such material may be used as
evidence.
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or
goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment
thereof, are totally different things from a search for and
seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose
of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them
as evidence against him.'
This distinction between proper searches for contraband or forfeited
material and searches solely for evidence is not peculiar to the Boyd
case. It is embodied in rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and has been followed by the Court in at least three leading
cases.6

Whether or not the Boyd case was correct to condemn searches
merely for evidence, it is clear that the thing which Boyd, the state
confession cases, the ordinary notion of self-incrimination, and perhaps
even Rochin have in common is that in them the evidence was not
subject to governmental compulsion in any form. Mapp is not similar
because the object of the search there was one which Boyd (and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the later cases) explicitly
describe as a proper object of a search: "the search and seizure of articles
and things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession." 64
Thus even if the doctrine of Boyd and the state confession cases have a
basis in the rule against self-incrimination, there is no similar selfincrimination in Mapp.
Finally, to decide Mapp in direct reliance upon Boyd-a federal
prosecution--or upon any principle of self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment is, as Mr. Justice Black concedes, to agree with what he
"regard[s] to be the proper approach to interpretation of our Bill of
Rights," 65 that is, that the constitutional protection against selfincrimination is the same with regard to the states as to the federal
government. The Court has rejected this view over Justice Black's
66 and Mapp does not say that the
dissent in Adamson v. California,
U.S. at 623.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331

102116

63

U.S. 145 (1947); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
64116 U.S. at 624.
6 367 U.S. at 665.
66332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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Court has changed its position on this. Had the Court been relying
upon a theory of self-incrimination in Mapp, where the application of
such a theory is not obvious, it can be expected that there would have
been some discussion of the ruling of Adamson.
Thus, the only constitutional purpose supporting the decision in
Mapp which seems to have substantial force is the purpose of deterring
state police from constitutional infractions. That purpose is fully
served through prospective application, and there seems no need generally to disturb legitimate reliance on Wolf v. Colorado.

IV. THE

PRECEDENTS

The Mapp opinion contains several statements which are at least
consistent with Mapp's solely prospective effect. For example:
Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally seized, but a State's attorney across the street
67
may ....
If the fruits of an unconstitutional search had been inadmissible in both state and federal courts, this inducement to
evasion [the use of those "fruits" in a state prosecution],
would have been sooner eliminated."
Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under
constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches. 9
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the
States,

..

.

we can no longer permit that right to remain

an empty promise.70

These do not seem to reflect conscious disposition of the issue."1
At most, they may indicate that the Court was not aware of the potential retroactivity of its decision while being consciously determined
that the decision should be retroactive. It is unlikely that such loose
language would have been used if the Court had consciously decided
to make Mapp retroactive. This is not entirely without importance
67367 U.S. at 657. (Emphasis added.)
68 Id. at 658. (Emphasis added.)
69 Ibid.
70

Id. at 660.

(Emphasis added.)

71 Some state courts since Mapp have relied on this and other similar language
in the opinion as indicating that the Court fully intended Mapp to be prospective.
See cases discussed in the Note appended to this article, pp. 680-83 infra. Others
have thought that the Court indicated precisely the opposite. See Allen, supra note
30, at 43: "The short of the matter appears to be that in Mapp the Court fully expected its decision to be given retrospective application." See also Friendly, Reactions
of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 236 n.105 (1961).
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should it be argued on the basis of some other part of the opinion that
the Court has, in fact, authoritatively ruled that its decision is retroactive.
The only words of the Mapp opinion which seem to support retroactivity are in a mysterious footnote-number nine, which is appended
to a text passage having no apparent connection with the question.
The text passage is:
There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge)
Cardozo, that under our constitutional exclusionary doctrine
"[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y., at 21, 150 N.E., at 587.
In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result [of the Mapp
decision] .72

Footnote nine then reads as follows:
As is always the case, however, state procedural requirements governing assertion and pursuance of direct and collateral constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions must
be respected. We note, moreover, that the class of state convictions possibly affected by this decision is of relatively narrow compass when compared with Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
252, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, and Herman v. Claudy,
350 U.S. 116. In those cases the same contention was urged
and later proved unfounded. In any case, further delay in
reaching the present result could have no effect other than to
compound the difficulties.7"
Although I think this footnote is relevant to Mapp's retroactive
application, it is difficult to pin down its meaning because the Court
uses words having no obvious significance and does not explain what
significance was intended. What, for example, is "the same contention" which "was urged and later proved unfounded" in Burns v. Ohio,
Griffin v. Illinois, and Herman v. Claudy? No "contention" at all is
stated in the footnote. The only "contention" in the preceding text,
that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered,"
is irrelevant to Burns, Griffin, and Herman, since it relates solely to
the wisdom of excluding evidence as a means of controlling police misconduct. Burns, Griffin, and Herman had nothing to do with illegally
seized evidence.
Some clue may be found in the footnote's last sentence. It speaks
of "difficulties" which would be "compound[ed] by further delay."
I can think of only one possible set of such legitimate "difficulties"
72 367 U.S. at 659.
7 Id. at 659 n.9.
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connected with the formulation of a new exclusionary rule. Those are
the "difficulties", such as they would be, of the new rule's retroactive
application.74 If the rule is to be retroactive, the longer the Court
waits to overrule Wolf v. Colorado the more state prisoners convicted
under Wolf there will be to claim retroactive benefit when the overruling comes, thus perhaps "compounding" the difficulties. 5 If those
are the "difficulties" and if footnote nine does indeed deal with the
problem of retroactivity, then the "same contention" which "proved
unfounded" in Burns, Griffin, and Herman may well be the "contention" that retrospectively invalidating an important aspect of state
criminal procedure will result in the inordinate reexamination of a
great number of past convictions. This contention was, in fact, expressly made in the opinion of one Justice in Griffin,76 is suggested in
the dissent in Mapp,7" and may have been below the surface of the
opinions in Burns and Herman.
Footnote nine then makes some sense if it is assumed that the
Court took it for granted Mapp was to be retroactive. In this light,
the footnote is a defense of the new decision despite that assumed retroactivity. The footnote, although it never articulates the result, attempts to play down the likely effects of retroactive application and to
characterize them as unavoidable in any case.
Is Mapp's retroactivity to be deemed settled by such a footnote?
I think not. The general statements from the Court's opinion quoted
earlier contradict any impression drawn from the footnote that the
Court indeed consciously assumed that Mapp would be retroactive.
But even if one is willing to accept the tangled analysis just given as
indicating a silent assumption on the Court's part that Mapp was to be
retroactive, I do not think that should be taken as the equivalent of a
disposition of the question. Unless the solution is obvious or the problem unworthy of the Supreme Court's considered disposition, law
simply should not be made through silent assumptions hidden away
in mysterious footnotes. For many good reasons, decision rightly
calls for some attempt at articulation, of both the problem and the
reasons for a court's decision.
74 1 do not count the "difficulties" that might result from a change in the personnel
of the Court which might dissipate the present majority favoring the overruling of

Wolf.

75
This assumes that as time goes on the number of prisoners incarcerated
through unconstitutionally seized evidence would increase were Wolf not overruled
-probably a fair assumption.
76
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25 (1956) (Frankdurter, J., concurring).
77
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting) : "[T]he issue which
is now being decided may well have untoward practical ramifications respecting state
cases long since disposed of in reliance upon Wolf."
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The answer may be that the Court, including at least some of the
dissenters, did believe the solution obvious and beyond dispute because
of a belief that Mapp, as a constitutional decision, inevitably had to be
retroactive. But retroactivity is not required where there are reasons
for refusing to apply a constitutional ruling to previous events, and I
have tried to show that such reasons are present in the case of Mapp.
There is also reason to believe from footnote nine that the Court may
have assumed retroactivity in the belief that the practical consequences
would not be significant. I have tried to show that that belief is also
wrong. The prospect of having a serious problem disposed of through
an assumption without apparent consideration of the contrary arguments is, moreover, especially disturbing in Mapp. The Mapp decision
came out of the blue. As the opinions show, the proposition that Wolf
should be overruled was not urged at all by the appellant and was only
"request[ed]" without argument in the brief of an amicus curiae78
This lack of argument may not have affected the sufficiency of the
Court's consideration of whether to overrule Wolf, but it surely makes it
unlikely, in view of the inadequacy of the opinion on the point, that the
retroactive effect of the new decision has yet been fully considered in
the Court. There is no reason not to consider it now, in a proper case.
This ought to be done, if deep consideration is the proper basis for
lasting judgment.
Are there cases in the Supreme Court before Mapp which settle
the problem as the Mapp opinion does not? The Court, not overtly
treating the question, cites none. So far as I can tell, there is one
generally similar episode in which the Supreme Court has taken relevant action. In Griffin v. Illinois,9 the Court held for the first time that
a state which affords appeals in criminal cases is obligated by the
Constitution to provide free transcripts to indigents who otherwise
could and would appeal. The Griffin decision overruled no federal
statute or previous decision of the Court. It did, however, flow directly from the very general commands of the fourteenth amendment
and may have upset a general assumption in the states that the constitutional rule was otherwise, an assumption upon which the states may
have relied. Indeed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Griffin,
speaking for himself alone and concurring only in the result, states his
general view that the rule of Griffin should apply only prospectively. 0
This suggestion was ignored by the remainder of the majority of the
Court, even though Griffin was a five-to-four decision in which Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's vote was necessary to the result. Griffin alone,
78

See 367 U.S. at 646 n.3; id. at 673-74 n.5 & 6 (dissenting opinion).

79 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

80 Id.at 26.
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therefore, contains nothing explicit which controls or affects Mapp's
retroactive application. Four Justices' failure to respond to Justice
Frankfurter's suggestion may indicate an unspoken assumption on their
part that retroactivity is necessary. Yet it may not. One cannot tell.
Griffin has, however, been in fact applied by the Court to litigation
taking place well before it was decided. Griffin was decided in 1956.
Eskridge v. Washington State Board8 involved a prisoner convicted
of murder in a state court in 1935. He gave timely notice of appeal
and moved for a free transcript because of his indigence. The free
transcript was denied, the denial was affirmed by the highest court of
the state, and the prisoner's appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed for
failure to file a certified transcript. After Griffin, the prisoner, still in
jail, alleging that his conviction had been unconstitutional under Griffin,
applied for habeas corpus in the highest court of the state, which was
denied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed per
curiam:
In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, we held that a State denies
a constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment if it allows all convicted defendants to have appellate
review except those who cannot afford to pay for the records
of their trials. We hold that Washington has denied this
constitutional right here.

.

.

. The judgment of the Wash-

ington Supreme Court is reversed and the cause is remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.8"
In a brief notation, Justices Harlan and Whittaker dissented, "believing that on this record the Griffin case, decided in 1956, should not be
applied to this conviction occurring in 1935

....

Mr. Justice

,,

Frankfurter did not participate.
Eskridge thus holds Griffin applicable to previous convictions, at
least where the prisoner requested a free transcript and showed his
indigence within the time prescribed for an appeal. Except for the
brief dissent, the problem of retroactivity is not discussed. The Court
silently assumes the answer, as perhaps four Justices did in Griffin and
five did in footnote nine of Mapp. If the problem of applying Mapp
retroactively were identical with the problem of applying Griffin to
the past, the failure to state the reason for Eskridge would not matter.
In the face of the dissent and after Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Griffin, Eskridge plainly represents a conscious choice to make
Griffin retroactive. But Mapp is so different from Griffin that the
81357 U.S. 214 (1958).
Id.at 216.

82

83Ibid. See also Patterson v. Medbury, 368 U.S. 839 (1961)

Harlan, J.).

(memorandum of
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silent disposition of Eskridge cannot control the present problem. The
primary reason for limiting Mapp to prospective operation, that the
purpose of Mapp--deterrence of police-is not served by overturning
previous convictions, is absent in Griffin. There are on the contrary
substantial affirmative reasons which might justify applying Griffin
to past cases which are not present in Mapp. Griffin is concerned
not with deterrence but with fairness to the indigent accused. If an
indigent has been unfairly deprived of an appeal deemed constitutionally necessary to afford him the same access to justice as a nonindigent, presumably he should now have his appeal, unless there are
contrary considerations. Nor are the reasons contrary to retroactivity
so strong in Griffin as in Mapp. State reliance is entitled to more
respect when, as in Mapp, it has been based on a case squarely in point
and later overruled than when, as in Griffin, it rests on assumptions
drawn from the absence of authority. Moreover, if Griffin has been
violated, that requires an appeal, not a new trial. A new trial will be
necessary only when there is found to be error, or no record exists.
The record or the undisputed evidence will more likely show whether
Griffin has been violated, as it did in Eskridge, than whether Mapp
has. And since Griffin is not an overruling case it is more justifiable
to limit its application to prisoners who requested a free transcript when
they wished to appeal, for the Supreme Court had not said that this
request was useless, as in Wolf.
To summarize: Griffin, Eskridge, and Mapp may all contain an
assumption on the part of several of the Justices that constitutional
decisions are necessarily retroactive. The truth is, however, that retroactivity is not inevitable. Since the Court has never articulated principles of retroactivity governing Mapp, and since there seem to be
good reasons why Mapp should not be retroactive, retroactivity in the
peculiar circumstances of Mapp still needs to be the subject of the
Court's deliberative decision.
V. DRAWING A LINE
Assuming that Mapp can and should be held to be generally prospective, the problem remains to draw the line between prospective and
retrospective application. What does "prospective" mean? Had Mapp
not yet been decided, one might say it should apply only to trials
held after the announcement of its decision. The result would be that
the new rule would not be applied to decide the Mapp case itself, for
the trial there had obviously taken place before the Supreme Court's
decision. This type of wholly prospective judicial overruling has been
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used in appropriate cases in some states, and James v. United States '
is not entirely dissimilar. There are well-known arguments against it.
It may be said that the Supreme Court should not undertake the final
formulation of a radical change in constitutional law in a case where
the change will be only dictum; that to do so is to go against the
notion that constitutional questions should be decided only in concrete
cases. It can be said to encourage disrespect for precedent. Since
prisoners are not institutional litigants interested in cases other than
the immediate one, it might be thought to discourage the development
of the fourteenth amendment through adversary litigation to establish
a precedent that new rules might not be applied in the cases announcing
them.
With regard to the Mapp case, these arguments against wholly
prospective overruling are not as strong as they might be. The decision to impose an exclusionary rule for the general purpose of deterring police is not enlightened in the least by the facts of a particular
case. In view of the specially prospective purpose of an exclusionary
rule, it is also improbable that its wholly prospective application would
discourage litigation of other alleged constitutional errors of a different character. If the Court is going to take upon itself the job of formulating a rule not keyed to the disposition of a particular case but
primarily designed to control the general process of state law-enforcement, and if that function is an appropriate one, there is reason to say
that that is also an appropriate occasion for a wholly prospective, somewhat legislative, announcement. On the other hand, the primary
reason for refusing to apply the newly announced rule in James and
some of the state cases-that otherwise the defendant would be subjected to criminal sanctions through reliance on a judicial decisiondid not apply in Mapp, where the state reliance upon Wolf was significant but not nearly so drastic in its consequences as reliance upon
an overruled decision exculpating from criminal liability.
Whether Mapp v. Ohio should be prospective in the sense just
discussed is moot, for the Court has reversed Miss Mapp's previous
trial. The opinion does not reveal that the Court considered not applying the rule to her case. In the light of the standard arguments against
overruling through dictum, in the light of the fact that the Court has
never in terms adopted the technique of wholly prospective overruling,
and in the light of the fact that the Mapp opinion does not discuss the
problem of retroactivity in the slightest, I do not think it can be argued
that the reversal of Mapp's previous trial automatically established the
retroactive application of the decision to all other prior trials. Not if
84 366 U.S. 213 (1961), discussed in text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
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the decision should generally apply only prospectively and if a justifiable line can be drawn. The situation, then, is that generally, previous
trials should not be affected by Mapp, while Mapp's previous
trial has been nullified. Can distinctions be drawn preserving the general prospective quality of Mapp, or need the new rule be completely
retroactive because Mapp's conviction has been reversed?
If Mapp's case has been reversed, and if the purposes of the new
rule do not call for reversal of any other past cases, why not simply
apply the new rule to no other past trials than Mapp's? In Molit6r v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist.5 the Supreme Court of Illinois so
held when, in a suit arising out of a school bus accident, it overruled
the doctrine giving Illinois school districts immunity from tort liability.
In here departing from stare decisis because we believe
justice and policy require such departure, we are nonetheless
cognizant of the fact that retrospective application of our decision may result in great hardship to school districts which
have relied on prior decisions upholding the doctrine of tort
immunity of school districts. For this reason we feel justice
will best be served by holding that, except as to the plaintiff
in the instant case, the rule herein established shall apply only
to cases arising out of future occurrences."(
This technique, in the view of the Molitor court, avoided overruling in
dictum and maintained the incentive to challenge vulnerable precedent.
There may be some prisoners who were tried before the announcement of the Mapp decision, however, whose cases are placed in time
so close to Miss Mapp's, or even after hers, that it does not seem
justifiable to treat them differently from her merely because the new
rule was announced through her case, not theirs. In the Molitor case
the court gave the plaintiff the benefit of the new rule but denied its
benefit to other children injured in the same accident who had also
brought suit

87

There ought to be a less capricious way to treat rele-

vantly identical litigants. Suppose that, along with Mapp's case, there
was filed another case in the Supreme Court questioning the continued
validity of Wolf v. Colorado. Had this case been decided on the same
day as Mapp's case, I assume the new rule would have been made applicable to it by the Court just as it was to Mapp's case. 8 Had the
second case been held for disposition in the light of Mapp, the same
85 18 IIl. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
86Id. at 26-27, 163 N.E.Fd at 96-97.
87 Since this article was written, the Illinois court has modified its ruling as applied
to other persons injured in the same accident. Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist., No. 36588, Ill., March 23, 1962.
88 Depending upon the reasons for decision there, Marcus v. Search Warrant,
367 U.S. 717 (1961), decided the same day as Mapp, may be such a case. In a
separate opinion, Justices Black and Douglas seem explicitly to have used Mapp to
decide Marcus. Id. at 738.
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thing would be true: If the exclusionary rule were applied to Mapp's
case, it would also be applied to the "held" case, no matter how strong
the arguments against general retrospective application. If a second
case was not so held, but merely stood behind Mapp on the Court's
docket, why should not Mapp likewise apply? If a defendant was tried
in Ohio one month after Mapp, convicted one month after Mapp through
unconstitutionally seized evidence, appealed one month after Mapp, and
brought to the Court one month after Mapp, it makes no sense to reverse Mapp's conviction but not his, even though the new rule should
not generally be retroactive. This is true if both litigants have argued
the overruling equally, but it seems especially so when, as in Mapp,
the litigant in the overruling case primarily argued a different ground
for reversal. In such a situation the Court simply fastens upon a case
which happens to be before it for other reasons to implement a decision
not meaningfully influenced by the arguments or facts in that case. 9
There seem to be two grounds upon which prisoners convicted
before the announcement of Mapp v. Ohio can claim to have cases at
least as recent as Mapp's: if their trials were at the same time or after
Mapp's or if their cases were or will be before the Supreme Court on
direct review at the same time or after Mapp's with the admissibility
of evidence still an issue in the case. If both these things are true the
case is in all respects later than Mapp's. Since Mapp did not forcefully
argue to overrule Wolf, it is probable that if the Court had not had
Mapp's case in which to formulate the new rule it would have done
so in the next case fairly raising the issue. The prisoner in that case
should not lose the benefit of the new rule because Mapp's case reached
the Court before his. It is true that every prisoner who had preserved
an objection to unconstitutionally obtained evidence when Mapp was
decided might not have carried that issue to the Supreme Court if
Mapp had not come down. But there is no way to tell which would
have and which would not. Without destroying the general notion
of prospectiveness, Mapp should be applied to persons, if there are
any, convicted after Mapp whose cases are pending on direct review
in the states or before the Supreme Court and who have not waived
the right to raise the propriety of the admissibility of unconstitutionally
seized evidence in their trials.
As to prisoners like Miss Mapp in only one of the two relevant
respects-time of trial or status of appeal-the easier cases seem to be
those where the trial may have predated Mapp's but where the admis89 There was, in fact, at least one petition for certiorari before the Court when

or shortly after Mapp was decided which the Court has "remanded for consideration

in light of Mapp v. Ohio." Winkle v. Barman, 368 U.S. 34 (1961). The case was
a collateral attack and the action was taken on the suggestion of the state attorney
general. See the Note appended to this article, pp. 680-83 infra.
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sibility of the evidence was still properly pending on direct review
when Mapp was announced. These cases would get to the Supreme
Court after Mapp's and could as well as Miss Mapp's have been the
vehicle for overruling Wolf had Mapp's case not come up. No sudden
change of conditions just before Mapp's trial requires that the new
rule not also apply to trials preceding it somewhat. If the case is still
pending on direct appeal, that at any rate fairly well insures that the
trial will not have been too much earlier than Mapp's trial. State
courts should thus now apply Mapp on direct review as well as at
trial when this issue has not been waived, and the Supreme Court
should dispose of any certioraris or appeals from such cases under the
new rule. 0
It is less clear that the new exclusionary rule should be made
applicable to prisoners whose trial took place after Mapp's but who
either (1) never pressed the admissibility of the evidence at trial or on
direct review and can no longer do so under state law or (2) did
bring the issue to the Supreme Court on direct review only to have
the conviction affirmed, the appeal dismissed, or certiorari denied. Such
cases could not, like Mapp's, have been vehicles for announcing the
new rule. Their claim to its benefit depends on an argument that
although the rule is prospective, it is a rule governing trial and their
trials took place after Mapp's, in which the rule has been applied. I
find it persuasive that the rule ought to be evenhanded, in that, as a
rule governing trial, it ought to be applied or not uniformly to all
trials held at the same time. To apply Mapp to cases where the admissibility of evidence was not raised would probably require a new hearing, perhaps in a collateral proceeding, to determine the relevant facts,
which is a conceivable reason for a distinction, but there is weakness
in any distinction turning on the vigilance of prisoners to challenge
Wolf while it seemed to be the law. It would not show too much concern for an orderly and fair transition from one constitutional rule to
another to hold Mapp v. Ohio applicable to all prisoners tried after
Miss Mapp as well as to all prisoners, no matter when tried, in whose
cases the admissibility of the evidence was pending on direct review
when Mapp was decided. It may also seem natural to the states to
apply Mapp to any conviction pending on direct review on any issue,
90 A few cases directly reviewing convictions have been reported in the states
since Mapp. In all of those which I have found, the courts have indicated that they
will apply Mapp to determine the appeals despite the fact of a pre-Mapp trial. Where
this was relevant, the courts have said that they will remand for a new hearing if
necessary to determine whether Mapp was violated. See the cases discussed in the
Note appended to this article, pp. 680-83 infra. In some of these cases it is not
clear that objection was made to the evidence at trial or that exclusion was urged
on appeal before the Mapp decision, but in all of them the courts seem to have
assumed that the issue of the evidence was still open to their review.
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although the admissibility of the evidence had not previously been
raised.OO
VI. CONCLUSION

I do not think it is inconsistent to say that the constitutional purpose of Mapp v. Ohio is not served by generally retroactive application
but that Mapp's case and a few others relevantly like it with trials occurring before the announcement of the new rule should nevertheless be
governed by Mapp. It might have been better for the Court to have
announced the new rule wholly prospectively, not applying it to the case
before it, especially since there was another ground on which Miss
Mapp's conviction could have been reversed. But the Court has applied the rule to her case, and that must now be taken as correct-if
only because it has been irrevocably decided. The Court should also
have the power to reverse other cases if it finds that they are relevantly
the same as the overruling case. In the implementation of a new
constitutional rule, the Court is entitled to see that unjustifiable distinctions between individuals are not created. A proper view of the
Court's function under the fourteenth amendment should not force it to
choose between permitting an unconstitutional practice to continue and
being capricious as between individuals in bringing about a necessary
change.
The distinctions I suggest between those previous trials which
will and those which will not be governed by Mapp are obviously not
entirely satisfactory. It is not easily defensible to say that several
months' difference in the status of a case on review or perhaps one
day's difference in the time of trial should determine which of two
inconsistent constitutional rules applies. If one views the lack of a
fully mechanical or totally defensible way to distinguish among cases
tried before Mapp's announcement as a barrier to making such distinctions at all, then one must choose either to make the new rule
applicable only to trials postdating Mapp or to make it completely
retroactive. Since the Court has already applied the rule to Miss
Mapp's case, the only logical choice would be complete retroactivity.
In view of legitimate reliance on Wolf v. Colorado and the fact that
the purposes of the new rule do not call for general reexamination of
previous convictions, it is safe to say that complete retroactivity is less
justified than a somewhat arbitrary line excluding most previous
trials. The line might be drawn at solely prospective application except for Mapp's case, but if distinctions are to be drawn between trials
91
See, e.g., People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.Zd 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S2d 462
(1961), discussed in the Note appended to this article, pp. 680-83 infra.
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antedating the Mapp decision, it seems to me that that distinction, made
in the Molitor case, is less defensible than those I have suggested.
The problem is not one of discovering the wholly satisfying or
wholly logical solution, for none exists. A sudden change of law,
especially for a deterrent purpose, is an unorthodox exercise of judicial power, and it is not surprising that the transition cannot be neatly
resolved through judicial decision. I do not see how the problem of
choosing what, according to relevant criteria, seems to be the most
satisfactory of several unsatisfactory means of transition can be
avoided. I have tried to suggest the proper guidelines for such a solution. What seems most important is that the Court restrict its choice
to one among those solutions which recognize both the generally
prospective nature of the new rule and the need for some equality of
92
treatment between Miss Mapp and prisoners very similarly situated.
92 Since reliance upon the old rule of law is a relevant fact in deciding whether
to apply the new rule to the past, a distinction among past cases might be the particular

disturbance to state law enforcement which would result through Mapp's application.
The Court seems not to have considered this in reversing Miss Mapp's conviction,
and that seems to be a good reason for not considering reliance in the decision of other
particular cases. An inquiry into the seriousness and irrevocability of the state
reliance upon Wolf in a particular case would in any case be difficult and unsatisfactory, since it would have to include, for example, an appraisal of the present status
of the state's case against the prisoner. State reliance should probably be taken into
account only as the basis for formulating general rules. If the guidelines of those
general rules are whether cases are relevantly as recent as Miss Mapp's, the states will
not be given many old cases to retry.
The distinctions I suggest in the text flow primarily from the fact that Mapp
was decided on direct review of a conviction. It may be asked what the situation
would be if Mapp had come to the Court instead on review from the denial of some
form of postconviction collateral relief, the prisoner having been convicted years before. If the Court had formulated a new exclusionary rule in such a case and applied
it to the prisoner, there would be considerable difficulty, if not impossibility, in making
any tenable distinctions between that prisoner and all other state prisoners convicted
before the new rule was announced. But this is not the way the Mapp case came to
the Court. If the Court had formulated the new exclusionary rule in review of a
postconviction collateral attack, one hopes that it would have addressed itself to the
problem of retroactivity more carefully than it did in the actual Mapp decision.
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NOTE
A few cases since Mapp v. Ohio (June 19, 1961) have explicitly or implicitly
decided aspects of Mapp's effect upon previous trials. Those I have found are described in this Note. The results of none of them are in irreconcilable conflict with
the suggestions of this article as to Mapp's proper retroactive effect, and several may
support my distinctions. My search for cases generally stopped on February 1, 1962.
FEDERAL CASES

Original Habeas Corpus: I have found six decisions in applications for federal
habeas corpus from pre-Mapp convictions which may have been generated by Mapp.
Hall v. Warden, 201 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. Jan. 23, 1962); Johnson v. Walker, 199
F. Supp. 86 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 1961); Mezzatesta v. Delaware, 199 F. Supp. 494
(D. Del. Nov. 16, 1961); United States ex rel Hunter v. Fay, 199 F. Supp. 415
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1961) ; Rayne v. Warden, 198 F. Supp. 552 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 1961) ;
United States ex rel. Gregory v. New York, 195 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. June 28,
1961).
In all the cases the petitions were denied. In two of the cases, Gregory and
Hunter, denial was on the solid ground of failure to exhaust existing state remedies.
In Gregory petitioner was convicted in New York before 1960, and his conviction
affirmed by the highest court of the state. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court in 1960. Four days after Mapp's announcement, he filed a writ of habeas
corpus in the district court, relying on Mapp. It does not appear whether objection
had been made to the introduction of the evidence at trial or on appeal. The petition
was denied:
In the Mapp majority opinion, it is not clear whether or not such ruling
is to have prospective or retroactive effect, but . . . [the opinion] in note 9
reminds: "As is always the case, however, state procedural requirements
governing assertion and pursuance of direct and collateral constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions must be respected."
It is not evident from the petition whether the question of alleged search
and seizure as claimed was presented to and reviewed by the Courts of New
York. In courtesy to the Courts of New York, it would seem recanvass of
these situations should be made by them, or state appellate reargument sought,
before petitions with this challenge should be entertained in this District
Court.
195 F. Supp. at 528. Hunter is similar, except that there it was clear that petitioner
had not previously objected to the evidence. "Relator appears to rely on Mapp v.
Ohio . . . Clearly, the state courts should be afforded the initial opportunity to
evaluate any possible retroactive effect that this decision may have on their criminal
procedures." 199 F. Supp. at 417.
In Mezzatesta the petition was denied on the ground of failure to apply for
certiorari following the affirmance of the conviction by the Delaware Supreme Court
in December, 1960:
[P]etitioners must first have exhausted available state remedies. Mezzatesta and Williams have made no application for a writ of certiorari to issue
from the United States Supreme Court .

.

.

. Counsel in oral argument

stated that the long standing rule of the Supreme Court as laid down in
Wolf v. People of State of Colorado . . . deterred him from applying for

the writ of certiorari as to issues related to the admission of evidence allegedly
illegally seized in connection with the State criminal action. But this is no
cogent reason for the present Court to allow petitioners to circumvent the
rule with respect to application for certiorari.
199 F. Supp. at 495-96. This result may be correct because of Mapp's prospectiveness
(Mapp's trial was probably later than petitioner's here, and the only opportunity the
state courts had to review the conviction directly was before the Mapp decision) or
on the theory that there is still an opportunity to apply for certiorari out of time, so
existing remedies have not been exhausted. It seems wrong, however, to say that
the petition must be denied because the objection to the evidence was permanently
waived through failure to apply for certiorari while Wolf was law, implying that the
result would be different if a petition for certiorari had been made and denied. See
pp. 657-60 supra.
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In Rayne v. Warden and Johnson v. Walker denial seems to have been on the
grounds that the search was not unreasonable, and also on the ground that there had
been a "waiver." Rayne:
I find by the weight of the evidence in the hearing here that the search
referred to was done by the express and voluntary consent of the petitioner.
It is not clear what, if anything, resulting from the search and seizure was
offered in evidence at the trial; but if there was error in admitting any part
of it, that error could be corrected only by a direct appeal in the case and
is not available on habeas corpus in the absence of such an appeal.
198 F. Supp. at 555. Johnson:
[O]n the trial of this case, the question was thoroughly explored before
the jury, and it was found, as a matter of fact, that petitioner had consented
to the search and seizure now complained of. Defense counsel objected to
the testimony on this point and was overruled by the Court, and then reserved
the bill of exception to the ruling .

.

.

. However, this bill of exception

was never urged on appeal or otherwise before any appellate court in Louisiana, and was not urged by petitioner until it was presented here at this hearing
for the first time. Hence, petitioner has completely failed to exhaust his
State Court remedies as to this issue and in all probability has waived any
constitutional rights that he otherwise might have had for failure to timely
urge this exception.
199 F. Supp. at 97. As in Mezzatesta, Mapp's prospectiveness, not waiver, seems the
better ground for denying these petitions. See pp. 659-67 mizpra.
In Hall v. Warden, the grounds for denial seem to have been a combination of
Mapp's prospectiveness and waiver:
I conclude that Mapp v. Ohio was not intended to require that a new trial
or release must be granted to a person convicted in a state court because evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search was admitted in evidence
at the trial, where the point was not raised at the trial and the judgment had
become final before the decision of the Supreme Court in the Mapp case.
201 F. Supp. at 643.
Supreme Court: In the Supreme Court of the United States, a petition for certiorari involving a pre-Mapp trial from the Supreme Court of Michigan has been
granted and the judgment summarily "vacated and, as suggested by the Attorney
General of Michigan, the case . . . remanded for consideration in light of Mapp v.
Ohio .

.

.

."

Winkle v. Bannan, 368 U.S. 34 (Nov. 6, 1961).

This case involved

a state collateral attack, rather than a direct review of the conviction (the Supreme
Court of Michigan affirmed the conviction in 1960, People v. Winkle, 358 Mich. 551,
100 N.W.2d 309 (1960)). But the suggestion of the state attorney general distinguishes
the case from collateral attacks in pre-Mapp trials where the State will refuse to
reexamine its holding in the light of Mapp. In Ker v. California, 368 U.S. 974
(Jan. 23, 1962), the Supreme Court has granted review of an appellate court affirmance
of a pre-Mapp conviction in which allegedly unconstitutionally seized evidence was
admitted over objection. See also Robinson v. California, 368 U.S. 918 (Nov. 20,
1961). Since California has excluded unconstitutionally seized evidence since 1955,
this may not represent a retroactive application of Mapp at all; it will, in any case,
be an application on direct review.
SiATE CASES

New York: New York admitted illegally seized evidence before Mapp. On
July 6, 1961, a state supreme court judge issued a certificate of reasonable doubt to
permit a pre-Mapp conviction to be appealed on the basis of Mapp. "The Mapp
decision will cause our New York appellate courts to restudy and reevaluate our state
laws of search and seizure in the cases coming before them. The present case may
be one of them." People v. Carafas, 219 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (Sup. Ct. 1961). The
next day, the court of appeals, in an appeal from a conviction in a pre-Mapp trial
to the "
argued but not yet decided, ordered reargument, "particularly with reference
effect of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mapp v. Ohio.. .
People v. McNeil, 10 N.Y.2d 749, 177 N.E.2d 48, 49, 219 N.Y.S.2d 606 (July 7,
1961). The appellate division did the same with an appeal pending before it. People
v. West, 14 App. Div. 2d 592, 218 N.Y.S.2d 971 (July 25, 1961). Mapp's applicability
on collateral attack in New York was raised and denied in People v. Figueroa, 220
N.Y.S.2d 131 (County Ct. Sept 28, 1961). Petitioner had been convicted in 1957.
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No appeal was taken. After Mapp's decision he petitioned the trial court (coram
nobis) to vacate the conviction under Mapp. It does not appear whether objection
to evidence had been made at trial but "there was no evidence adduced at the trial"
regarding the reasonableness of the search. Ibid. Petition was denied on the ground
that Mapp is not retroactive:
Mapp itself removes the last vestige of doubt as to the intent of the Supreme
Court to impose the rule prospectively and not retroactively . . . [relying
on some language in the opinion of the Court].

I conclude . . . that until

Mapp (June 19, 1961), evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable
search and seizure was admissible in the courts of this State to convict
Therefore coram nobis does not lie to vacate a conviction obtained by what
was at the time of trial constitutional evidence.
220 N.Y.S2d at 133. On November 30, 1961 the New York Court of Appeals decided that Mapp will be applied in pending appeals even though the trial predated
Mapp. People v. Lora, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
Defendant had been convicted in January 1961. The appellate division affirmed on
June 13, 1961, six days before Mapp. It does not appear whether defendant objected
to the evidence either at trial or before the appellate division. Conviction was reversed
and a new trial ordered:
There can be no doubt that it is the duty of State courts to follow the
Mapp holding in all trials taking place after June 19, 1961. However, whether
we are commanded to, and if not whether we should, apply it in pending appeals . . . where, as here, the trial was completed and an intermediate
appellate court has affirmed before Mapp was decided, is a threshold question
in this case. . . . While it is the general rule that we give effect to the
law as it exists at the time of our decision . . . some of the members of
this court have felt that we are not required to, and should not, do so in the
instant case particularly because of the language employed by the Supreme
Court in Mapp at pages 654-656, 658. The majority, however, are of the
opinion that we should adhere to the general rule, and review defendant's
conviction in light of the law as it presently exists.
Id. at 370-71, 179 N.E.2d at 480, 223 N.Y.S2d at 464-65. The trial record indicated
that the search had been unconstitutional unless there had been probable cause:
Of course, when this case was tried, the People were not required to prove
that the police had probable cause .

.

.

. Since the law did not require

such proof, the present record may not disclose what cause, if any, the police

had .

.

. In light of the Mapp decision, this conviction must be reversed

.

on the present record, but the People should have the opportunity to establish
the propriety of the police entry ....
Id. at 374, 179 N.E2d at 482, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 467. Since the case was in all respects
later than Mapp's, I would agree that this was a proper retrospective application of
the new rule.
Other States: New Jersey did not exclude evidence before Mapp. A state
collateral attack upon a pre-Mapp conviction was denied after a hearing on September
21, 1961, on the ground that there had been no unconstitutional search. Application of
Bogish, 69 N.J. Super. 146, 173 A.2d 906 (Law Div.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 824,
motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied, 366 U.S. 957 (1961).
"Another question which need not be decided in view of this court's finding that
there was no unreasonable search or seizure is whether the effect of the Mapp v.
Ohio . . . decision is retrospective in nature." Id. at 155, 173 A.2d at 911. On
November 6, 191, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied Mapp, as did the Loria
case in New York, to a pending appeal on a pre-Mapp motion to suppress evidence,
the result being a remand. State v. Valentin, 36 N.J. 41, 174 A.2d 737 (1961). Defendant had moved to suppress evidence before trial, and the motion had been denied
because New Jersey did not follow the exclusionary rule. Mapp had been decided
before argument of the appeal.
As the result of this new doctrine, obviously, if the shotgun involved here
was secured through an unreasonable search and seizure, defendant's application to bar its introduction as evidence against him is sound and must be
granted. .

.

. That problem cannot be determined on the record now before

us which the decision in Mapp has rendered inadequate. Undoubtedly, if
Mapp had been decided prior to the motion in the County Court, the Prosecutor would have presented whatever proof he may have had as to the nature
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of the search and seizure. . .

.
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[W] e do not believe that the Prosecutor

should be penalized for relying on what appeared to be the law of our State
at the time. For that reason, the matter will be remanded to the County
Court to permit both parties to introduce all relevant proof on the new issue
generated by Mapp.
Id. at 738. See also State v. Masi, 72 N.J. Super. 55, 177 A.2d 773 (Law Div., Jan. 30,
1962) ; State v. Long, 71 N.J. Super. 583, 177 A.2d 609 (County Ct. Jan. 24, 1962).
In Alabama a case was affirmed which challenged a pre-Mapp conviction on direct
review because the search was found not to be unconstitutional on the basis of an
adequate record. Apparently objection to the evidence had been made and litigated
below. Thompson v. State, 132 So. 2d 386 (Ala. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1961).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has reached the same result as
the New York Court of Appeals in the Loria case. Commonwealth v. Spofford, 30
U.S.L. W=nn 2455 (Mass. March 1, 1962).

